Solutions for Receiving Bank Transfers from High-risk Countries

编按:2018年12月华为CFO在加拿大被捕事件引起了国人的广泛关注,此后虽获准保释,但美国又开始加紧对加拿大提出引渡要求,美国检方正式指控华为CFO,现转发指控原文,以继续关注具体过程,刊发本文不代表本公号立场。声明:刊发本文不代表本公号立场Summary
of Facts事实摘要Wanzhou Meng (“Meng”), also known as “Cathy Meng” and
“Sabrina Meng,” is the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of Huawei
Technologies Co. Ltd. (Huawei”), a corporation organized under the laws
of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and the world’s largest
telecommunications equipment company. Meng is a citizen of the PRC and a
daughter of Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei. In addition to her role as
CFO, Meng currently serves as Huawei’s Deputy Chairwoman of the Board,
and serves or has served in various roles at other Huawei subsidiaries
and affiliates. Meng also served on the board of Hong Kong-based Skycom
Tech Co. Ltd. (“Skycom”) in or about and between February 2008 and April

澳门新萄京客户端下载 ,来源:美国司法部翻译:博士陈CHINESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONGLOMERATE
HUAWEI AND HUAWEI CFO WANZHOU MENG CHARGED WITH FINANCIAL
FRAUD中国电信集团华为和华为首席财务官孟晚舟被控财务欺诈Huawei Device USA
Inc. and Huawei’s Iranian Subsidiary Skycom Also Named Defendants
华为(美国)设备有限公司和其伊朗子公司Skycom也被指名为被告(译者注:Skycom注册地在香港)Other
Charges Include Money Laundering, Conspiracy to Defraud the United
States, Obstruction of Justice and Sanctions
Violations其他指控包括洗钱、阴谋欺诈美国、妨碍司法和违反制裁A 13-count
indictment was unsealed earlier today in federal court in Brooklyn, New
York, charging four defendants,including Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.
(Huawei), the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer,
with headquarters in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and operations
around the world. The indicted defendants include Huawei and two Huawei
affiliates — Huawei Device USA Inc.(Huawei USA) and Skycom Tech Co. Ltd.
(Skycom) — as well as Huawei’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Wanzhou
Meng
(Meng).今早,纽约布鲁克林联邦法院对包括华为技术有限公司——世界上最大的电信设备制造商,总部在中国,在全球都有业务——在内的4个被告提出了13项司法指控。被起诉的被告包括华为及其两家附属公司——华为(美国)设备有限公司和Skycom科技有限公司,以及华为首席财务官孟晚舟。The
defendants Huawei and Skycom arecharged with bank fraud and conspiracy
to commit bank fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud,
violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
and conspiracy to violate IEEPA, and conspiracy tocommit money
laundering. Huawei and Huawei USA are charged with conspiracy to
obstruct justice related to the grandjury investigation in the Eastern
District of New York. Meng is charged with bank fraud, wire fraud,and
conspiracies to commit bank and wire
fraud.被告华为和Skycom被指控银行欺诈、合谋银行欺诈、电信欺诈和合谋电信欺诈、违反《国际紧急经济权力法》和合谋违反《国际紧急经济权力法》和合谋洗钱等。华为和华为(美国)公司被控蓄意妨碍纽约东区大陪审团调查的司法公正。孟被控银行欺诈、电信欺诈和合谋实施银行和电信欺诈。Acting
U.S. Attorney General Matthew G.Whitaker, Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen of
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Wilbur Ross of the
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Attorney Richard P. Donoghue for the
Eastern District of New York, FBI Director Christopher A. Wray,
Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski of the Justice
Department’s CriminalDivision and Assistant Attorney General John C.
Demers of the National Security Division, announced the
charges.代理美国司法部长惠特克、国土安全部部长尼尔森、商务部部长威尔伯•罗斯、纽约东区律师多诺霍、联邦调查局局长克里斯托弗·雷,司法部刑事部门的助理司法部长布莱恩·A·本茨科夫斯基和国家安全部助理司法部长约翰·德默斯宣布了指控。“Today
we are announcing that we are bringing criminal charges against
telecommunications giant Huawei and itsassociates for nearly two dozen
alleged crimes,” said Acting Attorney General Whitaker. “As I told
Chinese officials in August, China must hold its citizens and Chinese
companies accountable for complying with the law. I’d like to thank the
many dedicated criminal investigators from several different federal
agencies who contributed to this investigation and the Department of
Justice attorneys who are moving the prosecution efforts forward. They
are helping us uphold the rule of law with
integrity.”美国代理司法部部长惠特克说:“今天我们宣布,我们将对电信巨头华为及其合作伙伴提出刑事指控,指控他们犯有近20项罪行。”“正如我今年8月告诉中国官员的那样,中国必须让其公民和中国企业对法律负责。我要感谢来自几个不同联邦机构的许多敬业的刑事调查人员,他们为这次调查做出了贡献,感谢司法部的律师们,他们正在推进这项起诉工作。他们在用严正的品格维护法治。”“As
charged in the indictment, Huawei and its Chief Financial Officer broke
U.S. law and have engaged in a fraudulent financial scheme that is
detrimental to the security of the United States,”said Secretary
Nielsen. “They willfully conducted millions of dollars in transactions
that were in direct violation of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions
Regulations, and such behavior will notbe tolerated. The Department of
Homeland Security is focused on preventing nefarious actors from
accessing ormanipulating our financial system, and we will ensure that
legitimate economic activity is not exploited by our adversaries. I
would like to thank ICE Homeland Security Investigations for their
exceptional work on this
case.”美国国防部长尼尔森说:“正如起诉书中所指控的那样,华为及其首席财务官违反了美国法律,从事了一项对美国安全有害的欺诈性财务计划。”“他们有意进行了数百万美元的交易,直接违反了《伊朗交易和制裁规定》,这种行为是不能容忍的。”国土安全部的重点是防止不法分子进入或操纵我们的金融系统,我们将确保合法的经济活动不被我们的对手利用。我要感谢ICE国土安全调查部门在这个案子上的出色工作。“For
years, Chinese firms have broken our export laws and undermined
sanctions, often using U.S. financial systems to facilitate their
illegal activities,” said Secretary Ross. “This will end. The Trump
Administration continues to betougher on those who violate our export
control laws than any administration inhistory. I commend the Commerce
Department’s Office of Export Enforcement, and our partners in the FBI,
Justice Department, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland
Security fortheir excellent work on this
case.”商务部长罗斯说:“多年来,中国公司违反了我们的出口法律,破坏了制裁措施,经常利用美国的金融系统为他们的非法活动提供便利。”“这一切将结束。特朗普政府对那些违反我们出口管制法律的人的态度比历史上任何一届政府都要强硬。我对商务部的出口执法办公室,以及我们在联邦调查局、司法部、国防部和国土安全部的合作伙伴在这个案子上所做的出色工作表示称赞。”“As
charged in the indictment, Huawei and its subsidiaries, with the direct
and personal involvement of their executives,engaged in serious
fraudulent conduct, including conspiracy, bank fraud, wirefraud,
sanctions violations, money laundering and the orchestrated obstruction
of justice,” stated U.S. Attorney Donoghue. “For over a decade, Huawei
employed a strategy of lies and deceit to conduct and grow its business.
This Office will continue to hold accountable companies and their
executives, whether here or abroad, that commit fraud against U.S.
financial institutions and their international counterparts and violate
U.S. laws designed to maintainour national security.” Mr. Donoghue
thanked the FBI, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI), U.S. Department of Commerce Office of
Export Enforcement(OEE) and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service
(DCIS) agents who are investigating this case for their tireless work
and
dedication.美国联邦检察官多诺霍说:“起诉书指控华为及其子公司,在高管的直接和亲自参与下,从事严重欺诈行为,包括共谋、银行欺诈、电信欺诈、违反制裁、洗钱和精心策划的妨碍司法公正的行为。”十多年来,华为一直采用谎言和欺骗的策略来经营和发展自己的业务。联邦检察院将继续追究对美国金融机构及其国际同行进行欺诈并违反旨在维护我们国家安全的美国法律的公司及其高管的责任,无论他们是在美国还是在国外。“多诺霍感谢联邦调查局、美国移民和海关执法局的国土安全调查(HSI)、美国商务部出口执法局(OEE)和国防刑事调查局(DCIS)的特工在调查此案中所做的不懈努力和奉献。“These
charges lay bare Huawei’s alleged blatant disregard for the laws of our
country and standard global businesspractices,” said FBI Director Wray.
“Companies like Huawei pose a dual threat to both our economic
andnational security, and the magnitude of these charges make clear just
how seriouslythe FBI takes this threat. Today should serve as a warning
that we will not tolerate businesses that violate our laws,obstruct
justice, or jeopardize national and economic
well-being.”美国联邦调查局局长雷(Wray)表示:“这些指控揭露出华为公然无视我国法律和全球商业惯例的行为。”“像华为这样的公司对我们的经济和国家安全都构成了双重威胁,指控的数量和范围清楚表明,FBI对这一威胁的重视程度。今天应该作为一个警告,我们不会容忍那些违反我们法律、妨碍司法公正或危害国家和经济福祉的企业。”Overview
of the Indictment起诉书概述The charges in this case relate to
along-running scheme by Huawei, its CFO, and other employees to deceive
numerous global financial institutions and the U.S. government regarding
Huawei’s business activities in Iran. As allegedin the indictment,
beginning in 2007, Huawei employees lied about Huawei’s relationship to
a company in Iran called Skycom, falsely asserting it was notan
affiliate of Huawei. The company further claimed that Huawei had only
limited operations in Iran and that Huaweidid not violate U.S. or other
laws or regulations related to Iran. Most significantly, after news
publications in late 2012 and 2013 disclosed that Huawei operated Skycom
as an unofficial affiliate in Iran and that Meng had served on the board
of directors of Skycom,Huawei employees, and in particular Meng,
continued to lie to Huawei’s banking partners about Huawei’s
relationship with Skycom. They falsely claimed that Huawei had sold its
interest in Skycom to an unrelated third party in 2007 and that Skycom
wasmerely Huawei’s local business partner in Iran. In reality, Skycom
was Huawei’s longstanding Iranian affiliate, and Huawei orchestrated the
2007 sale to appear as an arm’s length transaction between two unrelated
parties, when in fact Huawei actually controlled the company that
purchased
Skycom.本案的指控涉及华为及其CFO和其他员工长期以来的一项策划,即华为在伊朗的商业活动欺骗了全球众多的金融机构和美国政府。正如起诉书中所述,从2007年开始,华为员工就欺瞒了华为与伊朗的一家名为Skycom的公司的真实关系,谎称该公司不是华为的子公司。该公司还声称,华为在伊朗的业务有限,没有违反美国或其他有关伊朗的法律或法规。最重要的是,据2012年末和2013年新闻报道透露,Skycom是华为在伊朗的非官方子公司,孟曾担任Skycom的董事会成员。华为员工,尤其是孟,继续就华为与Skycom的关系向华为的合作银行撒谎。他们错误地声称,华为在2007年将其在Skycom的权益出售给了与之无关的第三方,而Skycom仅仅是华为在伊朗的本地业务合作伙伴。实际上,Skycom是华为在伊朗的长期附属公司,华为精心策划了2007年的交易,使其看起来像是两个互不相关的公司之间的一笔独立交易,而实际上,华为实际上控制着收购Skycom的那家公司。As
part of this scheme to defraud, Meng allegedly personally made a
presentation in August 2013 to an executive of oneof Huawei’s major
banking partners in which she repeatedly lied about there lationship
between Huawei and
Skycom.作为欺诈计划的一部分,孟涉嫌在2013年8月亲自向华为主要银行合作伙伴之一的一名高管做了一次陈述,在陈述中,她多次就华为与Skycom之间的关系撒谎。According
to the indictment, Huawei reliedon its global banking relationships for
banking services that included processingU.S. dollar transactions
through the United States. U.S. laws and regulations generally
prohibited these banks from processing transactions related to Iran
through theUnited States. The banks could havefaced civil or criminal
penalties for processing transactions that violated U.S. laws or
regulations. Relying on therepeated misrepresentations by Huawei, these
banks continued their banking relationships with Huawei. One bankcleared
more than $100 million worth of Skycom-related transactions through the
United States between 2010 and
2014.起诉书说,华为依靠其全球银行关系提供银行服务,包括通过美国处理美元交易。美国法律法规一般禁止这些银行通过美国处理与伊朗有关的交易。这些银行可能会因为处理违反美国法律或法规的交易而面临民事或刑事处罚。基于华为一而再再而三的不实陈述,这些银行继续与华为合作。有家银行在2010年至2014年间通过美国结算了价值超过1亿美元的skycom相关交易。In
furtherance of this scheme to defraud,and as alleged in the indictment,
Huawei and its principals repeatedly lied toU.S. government authorities
about Huawei’s business in Iran in submissions tothe U.S. government,
and in responses to government inquiries. For example, Huawei provided
false information to the U.S. Congress regarding whether Huawei’s
business in Iranviolated any U.S. law. Similarly, asindicated in the
indictment, in 2007 — months before Huawei orchestrated thepurported
sale of Skycom to another Huawei-controlled entity — Huawei’s founder
falsely stated to FBI agents that Huawei did not have any direct
dealings with Iranian companies and that Huawei operated in compliance
with all U.S. export
laws.华为及其负责人在向美国政府提交的文件和对政府调查的回应中,多次就华为在伊朗的业务向美国政府当局撒谎。例如,华为就其在伊朗的业务是否违反了美国法律向美国国会提供了虚假信息。同样,起诉书指出,2007年——华为策划了据称是将Skycom出售给另一家华为控制的实体的交易的前几个月——华为创始人向美国联邦调查局(FBI)特工谎称,华为与伊朗公司没有任何直接交易,而且华为的运作符合美国所有的出口法律。After
one of Huawei’s major global banking partners (identified as Financial
Institution 1 in the indictment) decided toexit the Huawei relationship
in 2017 because of Huawei’s risk profile, Huawei allegedly made
additional misrepresentations to several of its remaining banking
partners in an effort to maintain and expand those relationships. Huawei
and its principals are alleged to have repeatedly and falsely claimed
that Huawei had decided to terminate its banking relationship with
Financial Institution 1, when in fact it was Financial Institution 1
that had decided to terminate the banking relationship. Through these
misrepresentations, Huawei wasable to continue its banking relationships
with its other
banks.在华为的一个主要全球银行合作伙伴(起诉书中称为金融机构1)因华为的风险状况于2017年决定退出与华为的合作关系后,华为涉嫌继续向其剩余的几家银行合作伙伴进行了虚假陈述,以维持和扩大这些关系。华为及其负责人涉嫌多次谎称华为决定终止与金融机构1的银行关系,而实际上是金融机构1决定终止银行关系。通过这些不实陈述,华为得以继续与其他银行保持业务关系。In
2017, when Huawei became aware of the government’s investigation, Huawei
and its subsidiary Huawei USA allegedly tried to obstruct the
investigation by making efforts to move witnesses with knowledge about
Huawei’s Iran-based business to the PRC, and beyond the jurisdiction of
the U.S. government, and by concealing and destroying evidenceof
Huawei’s Iran-based business that was located in the United
States.2017年,当华为意识到美国政府的调查,据称,华为及其美国子公司努力通过将了解华为伊朗业务的证人转移到中国,以及在美国司法管辖之外,通过隐瞒和销毁华为位于美国的伊朗业务的证据,以试图阻挠调查。In
December 2018, Canadian authorities apprehended Meng in Vancouver
pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant issued under Canadian law. The
U.S. governmentis seeking Meng’s extradition to the United
States.2018年12月,加拿大当局根据加拿大法律发出的临时逮捕令,在温哥华逮捕了孟。美国政府正在寻求将孟引渡到美国。The
charges in the indictment are merely allegations, and the defendants are
presumed innocent until proven guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt in a
court of
law.起诉书中的指控仅仅是指控,在法庭排除合理的怀疑以证明被告有罪之前,被告被假定无罪。The
indictment unsealed today is assignedto U.S. District Judge Ann M.
Donnelly of the Eastern District of New
York.今天公布的起诉书交给了纽约东区的美国地区法官安·m·唐纳利(Ann M.
Donnelly)。The government’s investigation is
ongoing.政府的调查正在进行中。The investigation is being jointly
conducted by the FBI’s New York Field Office, HSI’s New York Field
Office,OEE’s New York Field Office, and DCIS’s Southwest and Northeast
FieldOffices. Agents from the FBI, HSI, andOEE offices in Dallas
provided significant support and assistance. The government’s case is
being handled by the National Security and Cybercrime and Business and
Securities Fraud Sections ofthe U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern
District of New York, the JusticeDepartment’s Criminal Division’s Money
Laundering and Asset Recovery Section(MLARS), and the Justice
Department’s National Security Division’s Counter intelligence and
Export Control Section
(CES).调查由联邦调查局的纽约外勤处、HSI的纽约外勤处、OEE的纽约外勤处以及DCIS的西南和东北外勤处联合进行。达拉斯联邦调查局、HSI和OEE办公室的特工提供了大量的支持和帮助。……(分工)Assistant
U.S. Attorneys Alexander A.Solomon, Julia Nestor, David K. Kessler,
Kaitlin Farrell, and Sarah Evans,MLARS Trial Attorneys Laura Billings
and Christian Nauvel, and CES TrialAttorneys Thea D. R. Kendler and
David Lim are in charge of the prosecution,with assistance provided by
Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark Penley of the NorthernDistrict of Texas,
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Brian Morris and Brendan King ofthe Eastern
District of New York’s Civil Division and Trial Attorneys
AndrewFinkelman and Margaret O’Malley of DOJ’s Office of International
Affairs. Additional Criminal Division and NationalSecurity Division
Trial Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys within U.S.Attorney’s
Offices for the Northern District of Texas, the Eastern District
ofTexas, and the Northern District of California have provided
valuableassistance with various aspects of this
investigation.……(分工)The Defendants(4名被告):Huawei Technologies
Co. Ltd.Huawei Device USA Inc.Skycom Tech Co. Ltd.Meng Wanzhou, also
known as “Cathy Meng”and “Sabrina Meng”Age: 46Residence: People’s
Republic Of ChinaE.D.N.Y. Docket No. 18-CR-457 (AMD)[1] The indictment
charges other individualswho have not yet been apprehended and whose
names will not be publicly releasedat this time.

International transfer between banks involving newly sanctioned
countries may get interrupted or stuck. The United Nations, European
Union, and the
UnitedStatescame
out with new and updated sanctions on the banking industries of targeted
countries.

  1. According to financial statements for Skycom for the years 2009
    and 2010, the “principal activities of Skycom were engaged in [sic]
    investment holding and acting as a contractor for contracts undertaking
    [sic] in Iran.”孟晚舟,英文名Cathy Meng或Sabrina
    Meng,是华为技术有限公司(以下简称“华为”)的首席财务官。华为依据中国的法律运营,是全球最大的电信设备提供商。孟晚舟是中国公民,其为华为创始人任正非的女儿。除了是CFO,她也是华为的副董事长。她还在多家华为子公司中担任过或正在担任职务。孟晚舟也曾于2008年2月至2009年4月前后,在总部位于香港的Skycom科技有限公司(以下简称“Skycom”)担任过董事。Skycom
    2009和2010年的财报显示:Skycom的主要业务是投资控股并担任与伊朗(签订)的合同的承包商。According
    to information obtained through an investigation by U.S. authorities,
    including the following, Huawei operated Skycom as an unofficial
    subsidiary to conduct business in Iran while concealing Skycom’s link to
    Huawei. In this manner and as explained in further detail below, Huawei
    could conceal the nature of certain business it was conducting in and
    related to Iran, which is generally considered a high-risk
    jurisdiction.根据美国当局调查所获得的信息(以下有述):华为将Skycom作为非官方的子公司运营,以此开展在伊朗的业务,同时隐瞒了两家公司间的联系。华为用这种方式隐瞒了它在伊朗境内开展的以及与伊朗有关的业务信息,而这一块通常被认为是一个高风险管辖区。具体细节如下:Former
    employees of Skycom have stated, in sum and substance, that Skycom was
    not distinct from Huawei. For example, Skycom employees had Huawei email
    addresses and badges, individuals working in Iran used different sets of
    stationery (“Huawei” and “Skycom”) for different business purposes, and
    the leadership of Skycom in Iran were Huawei
    employees;根据Skycom前雇员的陈述,无论是整体还是细节,Skycom都和华为关系密切。例如,Skycom的雇员用华为的电邮地址,有华为的徽章。在伊朗工作的人员根据不同的业务需要使用不同的文具(华为和Skycom都有)。Skycom在伊朗的领导层是华为的雇员;Documents
    show that multiple Skycom bank accounts were controlled by Huawei
    employees, and Huawei employees were signatories on these accounts
    between 2007 and
    2013;文件显示,多个Skycom的银行账号是由华为雇员控制的,这些雇员2007-2013年间是账户的签字人;Documents
    and email records show that persons listed as “Managing Directors” for
    Skycom were Huawei
    employees;文档和电子邮件的记录显示:被列为“Skycom经理”的人员是华为的雇员;Skycom
    official documents, including several Memoranda of Understanding, bore
    the Huawei
    logo;Skycom的官方文件,包括几份备忘录,上面有Huawei的商标;Email
    correspondence and other records show that all identified Skycom
    business was conducted using “@huawei.com” email addresses;
    and电邮通信和其它记录显示:所有被确认的Skycom的业务使用的都是包含“@huawei.com”的电邮地址;Documents
    show that a purportedly unrelated entity to which Skycom was supposedly
    “sold” in 2009 was actually also controlled by Huawei until at least in
    or about
    2014.文件显示:据传2009年收购了Skycom的一家先前被认为并不相关的实体事实上也是由华为控制的,直到2014年前后。Transactional
    records and other documents obtained by U.S. authorities further
    demonstrate that Huawei operated Skycom as an unofficial subsidiary to
    conduct business in Iran while concealing Skycom’s link to Huawei. Among
    other things, records obtained through the investigation show that
    Skycom was used to transact telecommunications business in Iran for
    major Iranian-based telecommunications
    companies.美国当局获取的交易记录和其他文件进一步显示:华为把Skycom作为非官方的子公司来运营,目的是为了在伊朗开展业务,同时隐瞒起了Skycom与华为的关系。此外,调查的记录显示,Skycom被用来为伊朗主要的电信公司经营电信业务。PROVISIONAL
    ARREST REQUEST FOR WANZHOU MENG孟晚舟临时逮捕请求书The investigation by
    U.S. authorities has revealed a conspiracy between and among Meng and
    other Huawei representatives to misrepresent to numerous multinational
    financial institutions, including a global financial institution which
    conducts business in the United States (“Financial Institution 1”),
    Huawei’s business practices, particularly Huawei’s control of Skycom in
    or about and between 2009 and 2014. Specifically, Meng and other Huawei
    representatives repeatedly lied about the nature of the relationship
    between Huawei and Skycom and the fact that Skycom operated as Huawei’s
    Iran-based affiliate in order to continue to obtain banking services
    from multinational financial
    institutions.美国当局的调查显示:孟晚舟和其他华为代表共谋向众多跨国金融机构做了虚假陈述,包括一家在美国开展业务的全球性金融机构(以下简称为:金融机构1)。虚假陈述的内容涉及华为的业务,重点是华为在2009-2014年间对Skycom的控制权。具体而言,孟晚舟和其他华为代表在华为和Skycom关系的实质上反复撒谎,隐瞒了Skycom作为华为在伊朗的附属公司运营的事实,这些行为的目的是为了从跨国金融机构处继续获得银行服务。The
    motivation for these misrepresentations stemmed from Huawei’s need to
    move money out of countries that are subject to U.S. or E.U. sanctions –
    such as Iran, Syria, or Sudan – through the international banking
    system. At various times, both the U.S. and E.U. legal regimes have
    imposed sanctions that prohibit the provision of U.S. or E.U. services
    to Iran, such as banking services. Of particular relevance, companies
    such as Huawei operating in sanctioned countries often need to
    repatriate income out of those countries by relying on U.S.-dollar
    clearing transactions, which typically pass through the United States,
    or Euro-clearing transactions, which typically pass through E.U.
    countries. Huawei was a customer of Financial Institution 1 and the
    other victim institutions, and conducted a significant amount of its
    international banking activity, including U.S.-dollar-clearing
    transactions, with Financial Institution 1. The financial institutions
    at issue, including Financial Institution 1, maintained policies by
    which they would not onboard Iran-based clients or process Iran-related
    transactions through the United States, so as to avoid exposure to U.S.
    civil and criminal liability. In response to due diligence inquiries by
    the banks regarding these internal policies, Meng and other Huawei
    representatives repeated stated that Huawei did not operate Skycom and
    that, with respect to Financial Institution 1, Huawei would not use
    Financial Institution 1 to process any Iran-related
    transactions.这些虚假陈诉的动机源于华为需要通过国际银行系统将资金从受美国或欧盟制裁的国家(如伊朗、叙利亚或苏丹)转移出去。美国和欧盟的法律体系多次实施制裁,禁止向伊朗提供美欧的服务(如银行服务)。尤其需要注意的是,华为这样在受制裁国家开展业务的公司经常需要依靠美元结算交易(通常通过美国)或欧元结算交易(通常通过欧盟国家),从受制裁国家转回收入。华为曾是金融机构1和其他受害机构的客户。华为与金融机构1进行了大量的国际银行业务,包括美元结算交易。涉及的包括金融机构1在内的金融机构都有相关政策,不与总部在伊朗的客户进行交易,也不通过美国处理与伊朗相关的交易,以免承担美国的民事或刑事责任。针对银行就这些内部政策进行的尽职调查,孟晚舟和其他华为代表反复表示:华为不控股Skycom,也不会利用金融机构1来处理任何与伊朗相关的交易。Because
    Meng and other Huawei representatives misrepresented to Financial
    Institution 1 and the other financial institutions about Huawei’s
    relationship with Skycom, these victim banking institutions were induced
    into carrying out transactions that they otherwise would not have
    completed. As a result, they violated the banks’ internal policies,
    potentially violated U.S. sanctions laws, and exposed the banks to the
    risk of fines and forfeiture. In particular, these relationships
    included the clearing of hundreds of millions of U.S.-dollar
    transactions through correspondent accounts at financial institutions in
    Eurozone countries. In essence, these misrepresentations exposed the
    financial institutions to serious harm and denied the institutions the
    opportunity to make decisions based on the true risk of processing
    certain transaction and the reputations risk associated with banking
    high-risk clients such as
    Huawei.因为孟晚舟和其他华为代表向金融机构1和其他金融机构虚假陈述了华为与Skycom的关系,这些受害的银行机构被诱使进行了原本不会发生的交易。结果,它们违反了银行的内部政策,并有可能因此违反了美国的制裁法案,面临着罚款和被吊销资格的风险。注意,华为与Skycom的关系包括通过欧元区国家金融机构的往来账户结算了数亿美元的交易。实质上,这些虚假陈述使金融机构面临着巨大的危险,使它们无法判断出进行某些交易的真实风险,并根据这些真实风险做出判断,也使他们无法判断与华为这样的银行高风险客户进行交易所冒的声誉风险。For
    example, during the relevant timeframe, Financial Institution 1 was
    under investigation for U.S. sanctions violations involving Iran and
    later entered into a deferred prosecution agreement pertaining to U.S.
    sanctions violations involving Iran, and could therefore have suffered
    criminal consequences for processing Huawei’s Iran-based
    transactions.例如,在相关时限内,金融机构1正因为违反了美国对伊朗的制裁(法案)而接受调查,之后达成了延迟起诉协议,并可能因为违反了上述法案(处理了华为在伊朗的交易)而面临着刑事处罚。Relying
    on the misrepresentations by Meng and other Huawei representatives,
    Financial Institution 1 and its U.S. subsidiary cleared more than $100
    million worth of transactions related to Skycom through the United
    States between approximately 2010 and
    2014.根据孟晚舟和其他华为代表所做的虚假陈述,金融机构1及其美国的子公司在2010-2014年前后通过美国结算了超过1亿美元与Skycom相关的交易。Many
    of the misrepresentations at issue were in direct response to a series
    of articles published by Reuters describing how Huawei controlled
    Skycom, and alleging that Skycom had attempted to import
    U.S.-manufactured computer equipment into Iran in violation of U.S.
    sanctions. One of the Reuters articles reported that Meng was a member
    of the board of directors of Skycom for several years. In statements
    reported in those Reuters articles, Huawei denied control of Skycom or
    violations of
    law.许多相关的虚假陈述都是直接回应路透社发表的一系列描述华为如何控股Skycom的文章。这些文章还指出,Skycom试图违反美国的制裁法案,将美国制造的计算机设备进口到伊朗。一篇路透社的文章报道说,孟晚舟担任Skycom的董事会成员已经数年。华为针对这些文章发表的声明中否认了控股Skycom和违反法律。According
    to information obtained from international financial institutions that
    conducted business with Huawei, after the Reuters articles were
    published, several of them, including Financial Institution 1, asked
    Huawei whether the allegations regarding their control of Skycom and
    business with Iran made in the Reuters articles were true. In response
    to those questions, Huawei employees and executives made a series of
    misrepresentations, both publicly and in private communications, with
    various banking executives, among other things, denying Huawei’s control
    of Skycom and claiming Huawei did not violate U.S. sanctions
    law.根据与华为开展业务的国际金融机构的信息,路透社的文章发表以后,包括金融机构1在内的数家机构都询问了华为:路透社文章中提及的关于控股Skycom和与伊朗开展业务的指控是否属实。作为对问题的回应,华为的雇员和高管们在公开场合以及私下沟通中都对银行高管做了一系列的不实陈述,重点否认了华为控股Skycom,并宣称华为没有违反美国的制裁法。For
    example, after the Reuters articles were published, Financial
    Institution 1 requested that Huawei provide further information and
    clarification regarding the relationship of Huawei and Skycom. Although
    those inquiries were not addressed to Meng, on or about August 2013,
    Meng arranged for a meeting with an executive of Financial Institution
    1, and during that meeting, made a number of misrepresentations to an
    executive of Financial Institution
    1.例如,路透社的文章发表以后,金融机构1要求华为就其与Skycom的关系提供进一步的信息,并作出澄清。尽管在2013年8月前后,这些询问并不是针对孟晚舟本人的,但她安排了一次与金融机构1高管的会面。这次会面中,她对金融机构1的这位高管做了一些虚假陈述。During
    that meeting, Meng used an English interpreter and relied on a
    PowerPoint presentation written in Chinese. Meng stated that she was
    using an interpreter to be precise with her language. After the meeting,
    an executive from Financial Institution 1 asked for an English language
    version of Meng’s PowerPoint presentation. Meng arranged for hand
    delivery of the document to Financial Institution 1 on or about
    September 3, 2013. The PowerPoint presentation included numerous untrue
    or misleading representations regarding Huawei’s ownership and control
    of Skycom and Huawei’s compliance with applicable U.S. laws. For
    example:会面中,孟晚舟安排了一名英语口译员,介绍方式是PPT推介。孟晚舟表示,用口译员是为了更确切地描述自己的意思。会议之后,金融机构1的一位高管希望能得到孟晚舟所用PPT的英文版本。孟晚舟亲自安排在2013年9月3日前后把这份文件递交给了金融机构1。这份PPT包含了大量虚假或误导性的陈述,内容涉及华为对Skycom的所有权、控制权以及华为是否遵守了美国的相关法律。例如:Meng
    stated that “Huawei operates in Iran in strict compliance with
    applicable laws, regulations and sanctions of UN, US and EU,” although
    Skycom was using the U.S. financial system to conduct prohibited
    Iran-related
    transactions;孟晚舟说:“华为在伊朗的运营严格遵守了相关法律法规以及联合国、美国、欧盟的制裁法案”。尽管事实上Skycom利用美国金融系统进行了严令禁止的与伊朗的交易行为。Meng
    stated that “Huawei’s engagement with Skycom is normal business
    cooperation. Through its trade compliance organization and process,
    Huawei requires Skycom to make commitments on observing applicable laws,
    regulations and export control requirements.” However, as discussed
    above, Huawei did not “cooperate” with Skycom; Skycom was entirely
    controlled by
    Huawei;孟晚舟说:“华为与Skycom进行的是普通的业务合作。华为通过合规的贸易机构和程序,要求Skycom做出承诺,遵守相关法律、法规和出口管制要求。”然而,如前文所述:华为不是和Skycom“合作”,华为完全控制着Skycom;Meng
    Stated that “Huawei was once a shareholder of Skycom, and I [Meng] was
    once a member of Skycom’s Board of Directors. Holding shares and a BOD
    position was meant to better manage our partner and help Skycom to
    better comply with relevant managerial requirements.” However, as
    discussed above, there were no “Skycom” employees who were managed by
    Huawei; Skycom employees were Huawei
    employees;孟晚舟说:“华为曾经是Skycom的股东,我(指孟本人)曾经是Skycom的董事会成员。持股和进入董事会都是为了更好地管理我们的合作伙伴,帮助Skycom更好地遵守相关的管理规定。”然而,如前文所述:Skycom没有雇员是接受华为管理的,Skycom的雇员就是华为的雇员;Meng
    stated that “As there was no process or organization at Skycom, Board
    supervision was the only way to ensure trade compliance. Holding shares
    or assigning Board member could help Huawei to better understand
    Skycom’s financial results and business performance, and to strengthen
    and monitor Skycom’s compliance.” As discussed above, even while Meng
    was on the Board, Huawei did not “monitor” Skycom’s compliance –
    Skycom’s “employees” were effectively Huawei employees who used Huawei
    email
    addresses.孟晚舟说:“由于Skycom没有(完善的)流程和组织,所以董事会的监督是唯一保证其贸易合规的方法。持股和指派董事会成员可以帮助华为更好地了解Skycom的财务业绩和经营表现,并加强和监督Skycom的合规性。”如前文所述,即使是在孟晚舟担任董事期间,华为也没有“监督”Skycom的合规性——Skycom的“雇员”实际上都是使用华为电邮地址的华为员工。Meng
    stated that “Huawei has sold all its shares in Skycom, and I [Meng]
    also quit my position on the Skycom Board.” As discussed, that statement
    was highly misleading because Huawei sold its shares in Skycom to a
    company also controlled by
    Huawei.孟晚舟说:“华为已经卖掉了其在Skycom的所有股份,我[孟晚舟]也辞去了董事职位。”如前文所述,这个声明极其误导,因为华为将其在Skycom的股份卖给了一家同样由华为控制的公司。Not
    only did Meng give this presentation herself, but both the written
    presentation and her oral statements to the executive of Financial
    Institution 1 refer to Meng in the first person, using the word “I”,
    indicating Meng’s personal knowledge of the facts surrounding her
    statements.孟晚舟不仅本人做出了相关陈述,而且在书面以及对金融机构1高管的口头陈述中,都使用了第一人称“我”,这表明她本人知晓有关这些陈述的事实情况。Following
    Meng’s presentation, several Financial Institution 1 risk committees
    relied in part upon Meng’s representations to continue banking Huawei.
    For
    example:在孟晚舟做出相关陈述后,金融机构1的几个风险委员会部分基于她的虚假陈述,决定继续开展和华为的银行业务。例如:A
    briefing paper from in or about November 2013 stated, “Huawei confirms
    that Skycom is a business partner of Huawei and works with Huawei in
    sales and services in Iran.” The minutes for the meeting reflect,
    “Huawei advised [Financial Institution 1] that its shareholding in
    Skycom was sold in 2009 and that Cathy Meng (CFO Huawei) resigned her
    position on the board of Skycom in April 2009 … [T]he committee agreed
    to RETAIN the relationship with Huawei
    …”2013年11月前后的一份简报称:“华为证实了Skycom是其商业伙伴,并与华为在伊朗有销售和服务上的合作。”会议纪要显示:“华为告知(金融机构1)其在Skycom的股份已于2009年售出,孟晚舟也已于2009年4月辞去了Skycom的董事职务。委员会同意维持与华为的(合作)关系。”Similar
    statements are in risk committee briefings from in or about February
    2014 and March 2014. All of the committees relied on Meng’s statements,
    and none of these committees took adverse action related to the Huawei
    relationship with Financial Institution
    1.2014年2-3月前后,风险委员会的简报中也有类似的声明。所有委员会都采信了孟晚舟的声明,没有一家委员会就华为与金融机构1的合作关系采取了不利于华为的行动。An
    executive at Financial Institution 1 stated that Financial Institution
    1’s risk committee decided to retain Huawei as a client because “Huawei
    sold Skycom and the Huawei Chief Financial Officer (CFO) was no longer
    on the Skycom board.” The executive further said that, had Huawei not
    actually sold Skycom, such a fact would have been “material” to deciding
    to exit the client
    relationship.金融机构1的一位高管表示:金融机构1的风险委员会决定和华为维持合作关系,是因为“华为出售了Skycom的股份,而且华为的首席财务官也不再担任Skycom的董事。”这位高管补充道:如果华为事实上没有把Skycom卖掉,这件事情足以让其所在机构与华为的合作关系画上休止符。On
    or about April 15, 2015, a Financial Institution 1 reputational risk
    committee met in New York City to discuss whether to begin providing
    banking services to a Huawei U.S. subsidiary. Meng’s statement about
    Huawei’s sale of Skycom was presented to that committee, along with
    other information. The committee declined to provide banking services to
    the Huawei U.S.
    subsidiary.2015年4月15日前后,金融机构1的声誉风险委员会在纽约召开会议,讨论是否向华为在美国的一家子公司提供银行服务。会议上有人把孟晚舟关于华为出售Skycom的声明以及其他一些信息提交给了委员会。该委员会拒绝向华为的美国子公司提供银行服务。The
    misrepresentations personally made by Meng were part of a broader
    conspiracy to misrepresent the relationship between Huawei and Skycom.
    Other Huawei employees and representatives made similar
    misrepresentations to Financial Institution 1 and to at least three
    other global financial institutions. For example, a reputational risk
    report from one of those financial institutions states that “Huawei has
    stated that Skycom is a HK [Hong Kong] local business partner and has
    no further affiliation with Huawei.” Some of these misrepresentations
    were made, involved, or resulted in interstate and foreign wire
    transmissions.孟晚舟个人的虚假陈述只是共谋捏造华为与Skycom关系的一部分。其他华为雇员和代表也对金融机构1及至少三家不同的国际金融机构做出了类似的虚假陈述。例如,来自其中一家金融机构的声誉风险报告指出:华为表示Skycom是一个香港本地的业务伙伴,与华为没有更进一步的联系。一些虚假陈述在(美国)国内和国外都有散布。IDENTIFICATION身份Wanzhou
    Meng is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China born on February 13,
  2. She is believed to reside in China. She is traveling to Vancouver,
    Canada on Saturday, December 1, 2018, on Cathay Pacific (CX) Flight 838,
    in transit to a third country, believed to be Mexico. She is scheduled
    to arrive at Vancouver International Airport at approximately 11:30 AM,
    PST. Meng will be traveling on a Hong Kong passport bearing passport
    number KJ0403962. The photograph attached to the Request for Provisional
    Arrest was obtained from a publicly available website for HUAWEI
    TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD, which represents the person depicted as Ms.
    Wanzhou Meng (Sabrina Meng), the Deputy Chairwoman, and
    CFO.孟晚舟是中华人民共和国公民,出生于1972年2月13日,据信居住于中国。她将于2018年12月1日(周六)乘坐国泰838航班抵达加拿大温和华,转机飞往第三国(据信是墨西哥)。预计她抵达温哥华国际机场的时间在太平洋标准时间上午11:30。孟晚舟持有的是香港护照,护照号码为KJ0403962。附在临时逮捕请求上的照片是从华为技术有限公司公开的网站上获取的,网站称她为孟晚舟(Sabrina
    Meng)女士,担任华为的副董事长及首席财务官。BASIS FOR URGENCY事件紧急The
    United States first obtained information regarding Meng’s travel to
    Canada on November 29, 2018. U.S. authorities believe, based on the
    totality of circumstances, that unless Meng is provisionally arrested in
    Canada on Saturday, December 1, 2018, while in transit, it will be
    extremely difficult, if not impossible, to secure her presence in the
    United States for prosecution. The United States has no extradition
    treaty with the People’s Republic of China, and Meng, who is the CFO of
    one of China’s major corporate entities and the daughter of its founder,
    has significant assets at her disposal. She has the ability to travel
    and remain outside of the United States
    indefinitely.美国最早于2018年11月29日获得了孟晚舟将飞往加拿大的信息。美国当局相信,综合各方信息判断,除非孟晚舟
    2018年12月1日在加拿大转机时被临时逮捕,否则基本不可能有逮捕她、保证她在美国被起诉的机会。美国和中国没有引渡条约,而孟晚舟作为中国主要实体企业之一(华为)的首席财务官及创始人之女,拥有很多资源。她有无限期逗留在美国国境外的能力。U.S.
    authorities believe that after in or about April 2017, Huawei became
    aware of a U.S. criminal investigation of Huawei when Huawei’s U.S.
    subsidiaries were served with a grand jury subpoena commanding
    production of, among other materials, all records of Huawei’s Iran-based
    business. As a result, Huawei executives began altering their travel
    patterns, to avoid any travel to or through the United States.
    Specifically, high-level Huawei executives, including Meng, have ceased
    traveling to the United States. Although Meng previously traveled to the
    United States multiple times in 2014, 2015, and 2016, her last trip to
    the United States was from late February through early March 2017. Meng
    has not come the United States since then. Moreover, another senior
    Huawei executive came to the United States at least four times between
    2013 and 2016, and has not traveled to the United States since
    then.美国当局相信:大约在2017年4月之后,华为觉察到了美国对华为进行的刑事调查。当时华为在美国的子公司接到了大陪审团的传票,要求了解和华为在伊朗业务有关的所有生产及各方面信息。从那时起,华为的高管就开始改变行程,不再途径美国。尤其是包括孟晚舟在内的华为最高层,完全终止了赴美行程。2014-2016年,孟晚舟多次赴美。2017年2月末至3月初,她最后一次赴美。之后,孟就没有到访过美国。此外,另一位华为高管2013-2016年间至少4次赴美,但那之后也没有到访过美国。

International transfers play an important role in trading. Lately, some
trading companies in China have failed to receive payments from their
overseas clients because the funds are being sent from sanctioned
countries. In this article, we will give solutions and suggestions to
help lower this risk.

Countries involved in sanction name-list doesn’t mean all international transfers have been interrupted or stopped.

A trading company in China failed to receive deposits from its client in
Russia, that was using the Bank of Moscow to make the transaction. So
far, there are 94 banks in Russia, including one of the country’s
biggest banks the Bank of Moscow, are on the sanction name-list of the
United States.

Apart from these 94 banks, the rest may be ok.How to tell banks in
sanction/sensitive countries can still do international transfers?

Solutions & Suggestions:

Do a test transfer:before the client makes a transaction of deposit
or payment, you can make a small test transfer to make sure there is no
obstacle between the overseas bank and the Chinese domestic bank. You
should especially do this with new customers, without any transaction
record with you.

Inform the bank in China:give early notice to the bank, which your
client is going to make the transfer to China. Check any sanction
information about the bank and balance your risk.

Clearly sanctioned countries are no-go:If it isn’t necessary, do not
transfer with countries which are CLEARLY on the sanction name-list.

Use banks you have used before with a client:If your clients are in
some sensitive countries and the previous international transaction went
well, it would be better to use the same bank for the following
transactions. And don’t forget to check the bank regularly.

Documents against Payment(DP) is risky for exporters:for instance,
the cargo arrives at the destination port, yet the
overseasimportermay
not get B/L from the bank due to things like financial problems or the
international transfer is stuck between banks. In such a situation, the
exporter may have no idea how to deal with the cargo. Generally, most
exporters require 30% prepayment from clients before shipping under DP.

Buy insurance and don’t gamble:accidents on international transfer
are included in the catalog of certain insurance companies. It may help
you mitigate financial loss. Add this expense to any dealings with
sensitive countries. If the added insurance costs make the deals not
profitable, it is better to let the deals go, then risk losing whole
shipments.

Name-list of countries for high risk of international banking transfer issues.

Sanction name-list can be checked here:

Countries like Iran, Sudan, North Korea, Syria, and Cuba are clearly on
the sanction name-list. Most Chinese domestic banks will refuse to work
on the international transaction with these countries. Some regional
branches of the same bank will have their own policies and may allow
these transfers.

Most of the domestic banks are not willing to be involved in any
troubles or even the hint of an issue. Standards to deal with
transactions of USD among some sensitive countries are unclear.
Especially since July when CRS was launched in China to fight against
money laundering and tax evasion. Domestic banks now manage
international transactions much more carefully.

The infographic below is the latest unconfirmed name-list of countries
for high risk of international banking transfer issues. This list is
unconfirmed by officials, and it is released by people working in
international trading.

澳门新萄京客户端下载 1

Using MoneyGram/Western Union are recommended to make international
transfers to countries above. If transferred by the bank, you may be
required to provide some documents to prove you are a legal business.

Required documents depend on the policies of different banks, most of
the case include

  1. Against Money Laundering Questionnaire

  2. Risk Commitment Letter

  3. Explanation Letter: the business relationship between exporter,
    importer, including the third party if participating in this trading
    activity.

One point should be specified:The cargo should not stop by the port
of Iran and the company must take the responsibility of any resulting
economic disputes and their consequences. It has nothing to do with the
bank.

If you have good ideas on international transfer, please free feel to
leave a comment below and share with us, let’s make business easy.

Reference: Sina Sohu, 浙江外贸,贸易金融观察

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